When manufacturing security teams think about cyber risk, the conversation usually starts (and often ends) with ransomware. This is for good reason, as manufacturing remains the most targeted industry sector globally, accounting for nearly 20 percent of observed ransomware attacks in 2025. Financially motivated extortion groups continue to hit manufacturers harder than any other vertical.
But there is another threat category that many manufacturers still underestimate, and it is becoming more dangerous as global tensions rise: hacktivist-driven cyber disruption.
Hacktivism is often dismissed as a nuisance problem, associated with website defacements and short-lived DDoS attacks. However, this perception no longer matches reality. Our threat intelligence analysis shows growing hacktivist interest in manufacturing operations, particularly industrial control systems (ICS) and operational technology (OT) for the purposes of causing disruption: stopping production, interfering with physical processes, and creating public, high-visibility consequences.
This activity is accelerating as hacktivist groups increasingly align themselves with national causes and strategic narratives. In some cases, these hacking groups operate autonomously while targeting organizations that advance a nation’s interests.
In others, there are strong indications of direct or indirect government support. This gray zone model allows disruptive activity to occur with plausible deniability for nation-states and limited risk of escalation.
In 2026, our team assesses with high confidence that hacktivists and cybercriminals will increasingly target manufacturers through exposed ICS and OT systems, in addition to virtual network computing (VNC), often through the use of publicly released exploits (including proof-of-concept code shared by researchers) and automated scanning templates. This will create ripple effects across the manufacturing sector.
As geopolitical conflicts intensify worldwide, cyber disruption has become an increasingly attractive outlet for retaliation and influence. Manufacturers should expect this type of activity to increase, and to hit closer to the factory floor.
Why Manufacturers are Such Attractive Targets
Hacktivists view manufacturing as an ideal target because disrupting production lines, supply chains, or industrial processes offers a way to generate high visibility and maximum pressure. Even short outages can halt production, spoil materials, delay shipments, or create safety risks.
At the same time, the convergence of IT and operational technology has expanded the attack surface faster than many security programs have evolved, creating pathways into systems that directly control physical processes.
This risk is further amplified by the volume of high-risk vulnerabilities disclosed across industrial environments. New ICS and OT advisories are issued weekly, often affecting widely deployed controllers, HMIs, engineering workstations, and edge devices. Many of these systems cannot be patched quickly without downtime or extensive validation, leaving known weaknesses exposed for extended periods. Complex supply chains and vendor access further increase exposure by introducing third-party pathways that are difficult to fully monitor.
Hacktivists understand these constraints and actively exploit them. Their activity is often calibrated to remain just below U.S. “red lines,” such as large-scale disruptions to the electric grid or public water systems, allowing adversaries to impose real economic and operational costs on manufacturers without triggering a broader national response.
The Groups You Should be Watching
A growing set of ideologically motivated groups have demonstrated interest in manufacturing and industrial environments, particularly where disruption can create economic or symbolic impact.
Pro-Russia hacktivist collectives were among the most active in late 2025. Groups such as Infrastructure Destruction Squad and Z-Alliance claimed intrusions into industrial control systems across the U.S., Europe, and Turkey. Most notably, their tactics have shifted from basic service disruption toward direct interaction with operational systems, including the manipulation of temperature controls and chemical process settings.
Other pro-Russia entities, including DDoSia Project, and affiliated collectives have also claimed increased access to OT assets across multiple countries, signaling broader experimentation with industrial disruption.
Pro-Iran aligned groups have likewise intensified activity. Entities such as Handala Hack and Cyber Toufan have targeted manufacturing and aerospace organizations, combining network intrusions with destructive actions. These groups have deployed wiper malware designed to permanently damage systems, reflecting a clear prioritization of disruption over data theft or financial gain.
Beyond these clusters, a wider ecosystem of politically motivated actors continues to conduct disruptive campaigns tied to geopolitical events. Groups such as NoName057(16), Server Killers, and Dark Storm Team have relied heavily on DDoS and extortion-style attacks, often timed to coincide with political or military developments.
While these operations may not cause permanent damage, they can still halt operations, delay shipments, and strain already tight production schedules.
Additional hacktivist entities including CyberArmyofRussia_Reborn (CARR), Sijjil Cyber, ByteBlitz, CyberForces, EMorocco Hacktivies, ShibuyaSec, The Alien Team, UserSec, Alligator Black Hat, GlorySec, Black Market, Nullsec Philippines, and KozSec illustrate the growing scale and fragmentation of the hacktivist landscape. Even when individual groups lack sophistication, the cumulative effect of sustained, ideologically driven activity presents a meaningful disruption risk for manufacturers.
A Different Kind of Enemy
Many of the technical controls used to defend against ransomware also matter for hacktivist threats. The difference is not what tools are used, but how they are applied and what risks they are designed to address.
What’s important to remember is that unlike ransomware gangs, hacktivists do not need prolonged access to these systems or have complex monetization strategies in order to be successful. These are hit-and-run-style attacks, so a brief outage, manipulated process parameter, or safety-related shutdown will achieve their objectives.
This requires manufacturers to think differently in several key areas:
Plan for timing-based attacks, not just persistent intrusion. Hacktivist activity often spikes around geopolitical events, elections, sanctions, military actions, or public statements tied to national policy. Manufacturers should treat these moments as periods of elevated risk and increase monitoring, tighten access, and delay nonessential system changes during those windows.
- Assume attackers may accept partial success. Unlike ransomware crews, hacktivists do not need full network control or prolonged access. A brief disruption, a manipulated setting, or a forced shutdown can be considered a win. Security teams should focus on preventing any unauthorized interaction with production systems, not just large-scale compromise.
- Protect safety and process integrity, not just availability. Hacktivist actors have shown interest in manipulating operational parameters rather than simply taking systems offline. This makes change detection especially important. Unexpected changes to temperature, pressure, dosing, or sequencing should be treated as potential security incidents, not routine operational issues.
- Expect more noise and less negotiation. Hacktivist attacks may not come with ransom notes, clear attribution, or communication channels. Disruption may occur without warning and without an obvious “end game.” Incident response plans should account for fast containment and recovery without relying on attacker interaction.
- Harden symbolic and externally visible systems. Hacktivists often target assets that generate public impact, such as production dashboards, customer-facing portals, or systems tied to sustainability, energy use, or national supply chains. These systems may not be considered mission-critical internally, but they are often central to the attacker’s objective.
- Prepare operations teams, not just security teams. Hacktivist incidents often surface first as operational anomalies rather than security alerts. Plant managers, engineers, and maintenance staff should know when unusual behavior warrants escalation and how to respond without making disruption worse.
- Coordinate security and communications planning. Hacktivist attacks are designed to generate attention. Manufacturers should plan not only how to restore operations, but how to manage internal and external messaging during a politically motivated disruption, especially if claims or public attribution emerge quickly.
For manufacturers, taking hacktivism seriously is no longer optional. It is now part of protecting production, safety, and business continuity in an increasingly unstable world.
